ABSTRACT. Research on peer effects in sociology has been focused for long on social influence power to investigate the social foundations for social interactions. This paper extends Xu (forthcoming)'s large-network-based game model by allowing for social-influence-dependent peer effects. In a large network, we use the Katz-Bonacich centrality to measure individuals' social influences. To solve the computational burden when the data come from the equilibrium of a large network, we extend Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)'s nested pseudo likelihood estimation (NPLE) approach to our large network game model. Using the Add Health dataset, we investigate peer effects on conducting dangerous behaviors of high school students. Our results show that peer effects are statistically significant and positive. Moreover, a student benefits more (statistically significant at the 5% level) from her conformity, or equivalently, pays more for her disobedience, in terms of peer pressures, if friends have higher social-influence status.
INTRODUCTION
Game theoretic network models have been successful to study social interactions which has been traditional focuses of sociology. A leading example is network formation, e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) ; Bala and Goyal (2000) from the theory side. Another example considers social interactions in exogenously given large networks, e.g. Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015) ; Xu (forthcoming) . In this paper, we extend Xu (forthcoming)'s large-network-based game model by allowing for social-influencedependent peer effects. In particular, our research question is whether individuals of high social influence (measured by network centrality) impose more peer pressures to their followers than individuals of low social influence.
Network positions are particularly important in studying all kinds of social interactions. In sociology, researchers use network centrality, a concept introduced already in the late 1940's, to measure a social individual's position, influence and prestige.
In network-related policy analysis, it is always disputable whether key players in a social network are more influential than ordinary indivdiuals simply due to their large number of followers and/or more central positions in the network, i.e. the "channel effects" (see e.g. Ibarra and Andrews, 1993; Burt, 1995) , or because of their extraordinary influence ability on their followers, i.e. the social influence effects. The answer to this question is crucial to evaluate e.g. targeting-and-remove key player policy (Lee, Liu, Patacchini, and Zenou, 2012) . This paper builds upon Xu (forthcoming)'s large-network structural approach. In particular, we assume an individual's payoff from her decision depends on her own covariates, as well as her direct friends' choices. As the fundamental principal in sociology, players benefits from choosing the same action of friends. There is an important substantive difference, however: we allow peer's pressures/benefits for conformity to vary with friends' (relative) social influence/prestige, which is measured by the Katz-Bonacich centrality (see e.g. Katz, 1953; Bonacich, 1987) . Such an extension is motivated from empirical applications on network-based policy analysis. Consider e.g. the targeting-and-remove key player policy. The constant peer pressure model will necessarily underestimate key players' effects on their peers by diluting them with ordinary players' peer pressures, if there are (economically significant) influence effects on peer pressures. The inconsistent estimator of peer effects could further mislead the next stage counterfactual analysis of the policy. Moreover, in our empirical application, i.e., studying dangerous behaviors of high school students, the estimation results using the Add Health dataset suggest that the constant peer pressure model should be too restrictive to provide consistent estimates.
To our knowledge, only a handful of papers consider social influence status (measured by network centralities) in structural peer effects analysis. In the spatial autoregressive model, Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009) develop a model that shows the Nash equilibrium outcome of each individual in the network is proportional to the individual's Katz-Bonacich centrality measure, which is assumed to capture all the direct and indirect influences of the network on a given individual. An important empirical impaction of their approach is: the more central (in terms of Katz-Bonacich centrality) a person in a network, the higher level is her outcome (i.e. criminal activity).
In contrast, we do not construct the network centrality measure from direct and indirect peer effects, but rather use the Katz-Bonacich centrality as an exogenous observable.
Observations of such a measure directly obtain from the Add Health dataset. Another important related paper is Liu and Lee (2010) , who use the Katz-Bonacich centrality as an instrumental variable for peer effects in a linear social interaction model. In our structural approach, we assume that friends' Katz-Bonacich centralities affect peer pressures on a player and therefore affect her outcome directly.
To solve the computational burden for solving the equilibrium of a large network game, we apply Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) 's nested pseudo likelihood estimation (NPLE) approach to estimate our large network game model. It is a natural idea to extend Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) ' approach to large network games: Similar to dynamic games, because of the large dimensionality issue, it is costly to compute the equilibrium in a large network game using fixed point algorithms. The NPLE method starts with an arbitrary guess of the choice probabilities, e.g. the predicted choice probabilities from the standard Logit estimation without strategic interactions. Then we conduct another Logit estimation by using the predicted friends' choice probabilities as individual's expectation on friends' equilibrium behaviors. After that, we obtain an update of the predicted choice probabilities. We repeat this updating procedure until it converges. Therefore, NPLE is an iterative algorithm which consists of a sequence of Logit estimations. The contraction condition established in Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) ensures the convergence of the algorithm. In a large social network game, the NPLE is attractive to practitioners due to simplicity of implementation and less time consuming.
Using the Add Health dataset, we investigate peer effects on conducting dangerous behaviors of high school students. Our results show that peer effects are statistically significant and positive. Moreover, given friends chooses "not conducting dangerous behaviors", then a high school student should benefit more (statistically significant at the 5% level) from her conformity, or equivalently, pays more for her disobedience, in terms of peer pressures, if friends have higher social-influence status. We also compare results from our model with Xu (forthcoming)'s model and the standard Logit model.
In particular, the peer effects are insignificant in Xu (forthcoming)'s model. In the Logit model, coefficient estimate for friends' social influence status is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Such a result suggests a negative correlation between players' decisions and their friends social influence status. However, it is implausible to give it a meaningful economics interpretation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and the definition of the Katz-Bonacich centrality. We also characterize the equilibrium and establish its uniqueness. Section 3 establishes the identification of structural parameters and provides NPLE. Asymptotic properties for NPLE are established and finite sample performance is studied by Monte Carlo experiments. Section 4 applies our estimation method to study peer effects of high school students on dangerous behaviors. Proofs of our results are collected in the Appendix.
A MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN LARGE NETWORKS
We consider a discrete game played on an existing large social network. The network is viewed as a random graph with vertex connected with directed edges: In the graph, each individual i ∈ I ≡ {1, · · · , n} is represented by a vertex, who is connected to a group of best friends, represented by directed edges. Let ij = 1 if individual i nominates j as a best friend, and ij = 0 otherwise. Following convention, let ii = 0 for all i ∈ I. Moreover, we denote F i = {j ∈ I : ij = 1} as the group of i's best friends.
By definition, best-friend relationship needs not be symmetric in our directed network; in other words, ij = ji is allowed. Furthermore, we denote the network graph by an n × n matrix L where the ij-th entry is ij .
Using graph theory, different metrics have been developed to quantify the influence of every node within a network (see e.g. Borgatti and Everett, 2006) . In directed networks, for instance, Knoke and Burt (1983) use the number of outgoing links and the number of incoming links to measure influence and support, respectively. Such kind of degree measures however are criticized for not taking into account those indirect connections to all the individuals in the network, but only immediate ones. Instead, we use KatzBonacich centrality measure as our social influence metric, as is suggested by e.g. Bonacich (1987) in the sociology literature. Specifically, for i = 1, · · · , n, let
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the so-called attenuation factor. Note that n j=1 (L k ) ji is the number of individuals who are k steps away from i in the network, where the network distance from i to j is defined as the smallest number of (directed) links that connects i to j. By
For our empirical application, the Add Health dataset contains such a measure with λ = 0.1. Figure 1 provides a probability distribution of S i (conditional on S i > 0). In particular, the shadow area is the 95% confidence interval. According to the picture, S i varies across individuals. 
where X i ∈ R d includes a constant and a vector of individual i's demographic characteristics, 0i , 1i ∈ R are unobserved action-dependent utility shocks, and
denotes the total number of friends. For expositional simplicity, we
unknown structural functions. In particular, α 1 measures peer pressures on player i from her friend j choosing the same action of dangerous behaviors, i.e.
measures the total peer effects that lead to conformity among friends in a social network.
It is worth pointing out that the payoff of action 0 is not "normalized" to zero. In our influence-dependent social interaction model, zero-payoff for action 0 is not an innocuous normalization for reasons to be discussed later. See Buchholz, Shum, and Xu (2016) for a similar but more detailed argument.
In the above payoff function, a key feature is that α 1 (S j − S i ) and α 0 (S j − S i ) depend on friend j's relative social influence S j − S i . Such a specification on peer effects is related to social influence models used in sociology, e.g. Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) .
In our empirical application, we investigate the question, if an individual's friends choose (not) to conduct dangerous behaviors, whether the amount of peer pressures from friends increases with friends' social influence.
Next, we specify the information structure: Let X i and L be publicly observed state variables, and ( 0i , 1i ) be player i's private information. Note that because F i and S i are derived from L, therefore they are also publicly observed state variables. Let
L} be all the public information in the game. According to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) solution concept, the best response function is given by
where
In equilibrium, players decisions can be written by
The case of Q i = 0 can be accommodated simply by letting
Equilibrium Characterization.
To characterize the equilibrium, we first make an assumption on the distribution of i .
Assumption A. The error terms {( 0i , 1i ) : i ≤ n} are distributed i.i.d. across both actions and players. Furthermore, the error term has an extreme value distribution with density
Assumption A is fairly standard in discrete choice model literature, e.g. Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2012). As a matter of fact, Assumption A provides a closedform expression for players' best responses in terms of choice probabilities.
Let σ * i (W) = P(Y i = 1|W) be the equilibrium choice probability of choosing action one. Let furtherᾱ
Under Assumption A, the best response function can be written in terms of equilibrium choice probabilities, i.e., for
To ensure the equation system (3) admits a unique solution, we next introduce an assumption on the strength of peer effects. Let S 0 be the support of S j − S i where j ∈ F i .
Assumption B. Let sup
Under Assumption B, the dependence of the equilibrium choices satisfies the mixing conditions, which serve as a key to dependent data analysis. Similar assumptions for equilibrium uniqueness in Bayesian games can also be found in e.g. Brock and Durlauf (2001) ; Horst and Scheinkman (2006) and Xu (forthcoming).
Theorem 1.
Under assumptions A and B, there exists a unique pure strategy BNE for any n.
Theorem 1 is important for statistical inference on large network games. When there are multiple equilibria, an obvious obstacle for statistical inference is the incompleteness of the econometrics model. For more discussions on issues of multiple equilibria, see e.g. Tamer (2010 Tamer ( , 2003 and de Paula (2013).
IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
For tractability, we linearize α(·) for our empirical analysis: 
. It follows by (3) that
whereS ji = S j − S i . Note that φ 0 cannot be separately identified from the constant term of X β 1 . Therefore, let φ 0 = 0 as a normalization. It follows that
which takes a linear expression of structural parameters.
+ , where Θ is the parameter space. The positiveness of φ 1 , ψ 0 and ψ 1 reflects the fundamental principal in sociology that friends benefit from conformity. Let θ 0 and θ be the true parameter for the data generating process and a generic value in Θ, respectively. Moreover, we denote
2 See Xu (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion on the definition of identification in a single large network game model.
Assumption C. E(Z
Assumption C is a high-level rank condition that requires no perfect collinearity of Z i .
Such a full rank condition can hold if (i) X i has no perfect collinearity; (ii) conditional on (X i , S i , Q i , {S j : j ∈ F i }), {σ * j (W) : j ∈ F i } has no perfect collinearity; (iii) For every j ∈ F i , conditional on (X i , F i /{j}), we have 0 < P(j ∈ F i ) < 1. In particular, the last condition requires variations in Q i given X i . Note that Assumption C is testable given Z i can be nonparametrically estimated (see Xu, forthcoming). Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions A to C hold. Then θ 0 is identified by
The proof directly follows our discussions above, and hence is omitted. 
Estimation. Our estimation follows Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)'s NPLE ap-
proach. Similarly to their dynamic setting, the difficulties in large network games arise from the computational burden of solving the equilibrium. Using an iterative algorithm, the NPLE significantly reduces the computational burden, albeit it is less efficient than the maximum (pseudo) likelihood estimation approach (see Xu, forthcoming). More importantly, the proposed approach is essentially a sequence of Logit estimations., which is easy to implement.
Consider a random sample {(Y i , X i , F i ) : i = 1, · · · , n} from a single large social network. It is worth pointing out that our approach can be easily extended to applications where observations come from a small number of networks but each network has a large size. In both cases, our asymptotic analysis relies on the number of players going to infinity.
Under this parametric specification, we are particularly interested in testing H 0 : φ 1 = ψ 1 = 0 versus H 1 : φ 1 = 0 or ψ 1 = 0. In such a significance test, rejection of the null hypotheses provides evidence for causal effects from friends' social influence on peer pressures.
NPLE algorithm. Let
n be the equilibrium choice probability profile and a generic probability profile,
Moreover, we denote Σ(θ; W) as the solution to the equation system:
Note that L(θ, Σ) is defined as the limiting log-likelihood function as the network size goes to infinity.
Given the above notation, we are ready to describe our estimation procedure: First, we start with an arbitrary initial value
Next, we iterate the following two steps:
Step 1. Given
Step 2. Givenθ [j] , let
where Γ(Σ, θ; W) = Γ 1 (Σ, θ; W), · · · , Γ n (Σ, θ; W) . This procedure stops at the K-th
is less than a predetermined tolerance, e.g., 10 −6 . Then, we define our estimator byθ N P LE =θ [K] . The convergence of the NPLE algorithm is ensured by the local contraction condition established in Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) .
By definition, the above NPLE is essentially a fixed point solution to maximize the log-likelihood function, which can be equivalently defined bŷ
See e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for a more detailed discussion.
3.4. Asymptotic analysis. We make further assumptions to establish asymptotic properties ofθ N P LE . (2007) suggest, the NPLE algorithm should be modified by selecting the fixed point that maximizes the value of the pseudo likelihood.
Assumption E. S X is bounded and Θ is compact.
Assumption E ensures that choice probabilities derived from the model are uniformly bounded away from zero, which implies thatL n (·, Σ [j] ) is also uniformly bounded for all j.
Assumption G is needed to limit the dependence among all the observations. In our Add Health dataset, M = 10.
For any h ∈ N and i ∈ I, let
) submatrix of L which describes the graph for the subnetwork among N (i,h) .
Assumption G. Fix arbitrary h ∈ N. The probability distribution of L (i,h) converges to a limiting distribution as n → ∞ for all i; and
Moreover, the payoff covariates X i are i.i.d. across players given the exogenous random network.
In the large network asymptotics, Assumption G is also made in Xu (forthcoming) for the consistency of an MLE-type estimator. In particular, this condition requires that the distribution of subgraphs should converge to a limit as the network size goes to infinity, and two non-overlapping subgraphs have independent connecting structures.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions A to G hold. In particular, Assumption B holds for all
In Theorem 2, we need restrict the parameter space for α(·) such that Assumption B holds for all θ ∈ Θ. Similar to the stationary restriction in the autoregressive model, such a condition imposes restrictions on (φ 1 , ψ 0 , ψ 1 ) that depend on the support of S j − S i . (2007), we now derive the limiting distribution
Following Aguirregabiria and Mira
2 . Note that A n and B n depend on index n through W.
Assumption H. θ 0 belongs to the interior of Θ.
Assumption I.
There exist non-singular (R + 3) × (R + 3) matrix A and B such that A n → A and B n → B.
Assumption H is standard in the asymptotics theory. Assumption I is a high level condition which requires (i) A n and B n converge to some non-singular limiting matrices respectively as the network size goes to infinity. Such a condition could be derived by specifying a network growing mechanism. Moreover, the non-degeneracy of A and B requires that all the determinants of A n and B n should be outside of an open ball of zero for all n, which is essentially a rank condition.
Theorem 3. Suppose all the conditions in Theorem 2 and Assumptions H and I hold. Then we
3.5. Monte Carlo Experiments. In this section, we investigate the finite sample performance of our estimator by using Monte Carlo experiments. First, we simulate a large network: The number of friends Q i of each player is drawn uniformly from {0, 1, 2, · · · , 10}. Given Q i , player i randomly nominates her friends among all individuals for generating F i . Moreover, we set
where W i consists of three independent elements: The first element is uniformly distributed on
the second is a standard normal random variable, and the last conforms to a transformed Bernoulli distribution 2 × B(0.5) − 1 ∈ {−1, 1}. In this setting, every element of W i has mean zero and variance one. Following the Add Health dataset, we calculate the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure S i by (1) with λ = 0.1. In this specification,
+ . Furthermore, we choose sample size n = 400, 800, and 1600. All results are drawn from 1000 replications. We set β = (−1, 1, −1, 1, −1) , (φ 1 , ψ 0 , ψ 1 ) = (1, 1, 1) , (1, 1, 0) , (0, 1, 0) , and (1, 2, 0) , respectively.
4 Tables 1 and 2 report the finite sample performance ofθ N P LE , including average bias, standard deviation (in parentheses) and mean square error. In all of our experiments, the estimator behaves well. In particular, the mean squared error decreases at the rate n as the sample size increases.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: DANGEROUS BEHAVIORS OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
In this section we apply our method to study peer effects on the dangerous behaviors of high school students. Adolescent risky behaviors have been studied in terms of peer effects (see e.g. Nakajima, 2007; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001) . To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no structural analysis on social influence dependent peer effects in the current literature. In particular, the research question we ask is how students of high social influence status, who typically are less likely to conduct (1, 1, 1 Note that
and ∂ 2L n (θ, Σ(θ; W)) ∂θ∂Σ
Therefore,
Because Y i is conditionally independent (conditional on W n ), by conditional central limit theorem (see e.g. Van der Vaart, 2000) and Assumption I, we have
where Ω(θ 0 ) is given by Theorem 3
